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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 03-4501
                    
MARGARET M. ANGELONI
   v.
THE DIOCESE OF SCRANTON;
VILLA ST. JOSEPH; HAZZOURI
         Margaret Angeloni,
                                        Appellant
                    
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
D.C. Civil No. 02-cv-00276
District Judge:  The Honorable A. Richard Caputo
                    
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 7, 2005  
                    
Before: BARRY, FUENTES, and BECKER, Circuit Judges
                    
(Opinion Filed: March 17, 2005)
                    
OPINION
                    
2BARRY, Circuit Judge
On February 20, 2002, Margaret M. Angeloni brought a sexual harassment and
retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
2000e-17, against the Diocese of Scranton, Villa St. Joseph, and Reverend Alex
Hazzouri (collectively “appellees”).  The District Court granted appellees’ motion for
summary judgment on October 22, 2003 and dismissed the state law claims.  A timely
appeal followed.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.  
I.  Factual Background
As we write only for the parties, we will confine our discussion to those facts
relevant to the instant disposition.  Angeloni worked as a dining room and kitchen server
at Villa St. Joseph, a home for priests in Pennsylvania, from August of 1996 until
January 19, 1998.  She was fourteen and fifteen years old.  Reverend Hazzouri allegedly
began touching her inappropriately a few months after she began working at Villa St.
Joseph.  She estimated that the touching occurred at least ten times, and always the same
way – when she was waiting on Reverand Hazzouri’s table, his right hand would come
into contact with her left thigh. 
In May or June of 1997, Angeloni told her supervisor, Annette Balint, about the
touchings, and then in July of 1997, Angeloni told her parents.  Also in July, Angeloni’s
mother had a meeting with Ms. Balint; by that time, Ms. Balint had spoken with Bishop
John M. Dougherty, the rector at Villa St. Joseph.  Both Ms. Balint and Bishop
     Angeloni did stop serving Reverend Hazzouri, but eventually resumed service to his1
table and did so of her own accord.
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Dougherty talked to Angeloni’s co-workers and to Reverend Hazzouri, and all denied
that any inappropriate touching took place.  Based on these discussions, they suggested
that Angeloni simply stop serving Reverend Hazzouri’s table so that she could avoid any
discomfort.   Bishop Dougherty also met with her parents that summer, and tried to1
reassure them that steps were being taken to make sure that Angeloni was not in any
danger.
No further touching took place, but Angeloni stated that in December of 1997,
Reverend Hazzouri approached her and told her he was worried about what she had said
about him.  Angeloni said she was intimidated, and told her parents. 
On December 17, 1997, Angeloni’s mother met again with Bishop Dougherty and
expressed concerns for her daughter’s safety.  Bishop Dougherty replied that he did not
think there was cause for concern, but added that if Mrs. Angeloni was worried,
Angeloni could stop working there.  He also suggested that they meet with Reverend
Hazzouri.  Mrs. Angeloni did not want to have such a meeting, and the family instead
decided that Angeloni should no longer work at Villa St. Joseph.  Angeloni’s resignation
was effective January 19, 1998.  She filed suit more than four years later.  
II.  Standard of Review
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.  See Sempier
v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 727 (3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment is proper
     For reasons that escape us, appellees did not mention the fact that Angeloni never2
exhausted her administrative remedies prior to filing suit.  See Robinson v. Dalton, 107
F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1997) (analogizing failure-to-exhaust to statutes of limitations);
see also Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that
a plaintiff in Pennsylvania must first present her employment-discrimination claims to the
appropriate agency before going to federal court).  Indeed, the first action Angeloni took
4
when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  If the evidence would be
insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find for the non-moving party, summary
judgment is warranted.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  In
reviewing that evidence, we consider it and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.  Eddy v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 369
F.3d 227, 228 n.1 (3d Cir. 2004).  
III.  Discussion
1.  Title VII Claims
The District Court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that: (1) there was no causal connection between Reverend Hazzouri’s alleged
touching and Bishop Dougherty’s “employment actions” against Angeloni to support a
claim of quid pro quo sexual harassment; (2) the elements of a hostile work environment
claim were not satisfied because no reasonable jury could find that respondeat superior
liability exists; and (3) there was no retaliatory conduct because Angeloni was not
constructively discharged, and therefore no adverse employment action was taken against
her.   2
with reference to this case was to file her complaint in the District Court on February 20,
2002.  
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A.  Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment and Retaliation
Both Angeloni’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim and her retaliation claim
depend upon her ability to prove that she was constructively discharged.  See Farrell v.
Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that a plaintiff
trying to prove quid pro quo sexual harassment must show that “her response to
unwelcome advances was subsequently used as a basis for a decision about
[employment].”).  This is fundamental to her claims, because “constructive discharge acts
as the functional equivalent of an actual termination” that can ground an employment
discrimination suit.  See Suders v. Easton, 325 F.3d 432, 446 (3d Cir. 2003).  
To find constructive discharge, a court “need merely find that the employer
knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a
reasonable person subject to them would resign.”  Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747
F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984).  Put somewhat differently, the plaintiff must show that the
alleged discrimination goes beyond a “threshold of ‘intolerable conditions.’”  Duffy v.
Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2001).  “Intolerability . . . is
assessed by the objective standard of whether a ‘reasonable person’ in the employee’s
position would have felt compelled to resign—that is, whether [she] would have had no
choice but to resign.” Connors v. Chrysler Financial Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 976 (3d Cir.
1998) (internal citations omitted).  
6Although we have considered an employer’s suggestion or encouragement that
one resign as indicative of constructive discharge, see Clowes v. Allegheny Valley
Hosp., 991 F.2d 1159, 1161 (3d Cir. 1993), any such suggestion or encouragement is not
dispositive.  See Suders, 325 F.3d at 446 (noting that the inquiry into constructive
discharge is “a heavily fact-driven determination.”) (internal citations omitted).  Here, it
is not disputed that, in December of 1997, Bishop Dougherty suggested that if Angeloni
did not feel comfortable working at Villa St. Joseph, she could resign; however, this
suggestion was made during the course of a meeting with Angeloni’s mother, during
which she had expressed concerns for her daughter’s safety.  As Bishop Dougherty
explained in his deposition, he suggested the possibility of resignation because he “felt as
a priest that [he] wanted to reach out to [Angeloni’s parents].”  A258-59.  Significantly,
during that same meeting, Bishop Dougherty offered to have a meeting with both of
Angeloni’s parents and Reverend Hazzouri to see if they could come to some sort of
resolution.  And, when Angeloni continued to work after the December 1997 meeting,
Bishop Dougherty said that he was “thrilled with that.”  A263. 
Not only does Bishop Dougherty’s suggestion that Angeloni consider resigning
seem completely benign, but the conduct of which Angeloni complained had ended
months earlier and the decision to resign was made by Angeloni and her parents at home. 
Given these facts, there is little or nothing in the record that supports Angeloni’s
argument that a reasonable person would consider her work conditions so intolerable that
she would feel compelled to resign.  That conclusion destroys any constructive discharge
     It has been assumed for the purposes of argument that Bishop Dougherty could be3
considered an “employer” as the rector at Villa St. Joseph; however, it should be noted
that Title VII defines an employer as “a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks”.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).  We do not have information in the record
confirming that the Villa would satisfy those requirements.  
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claim and, thus, there was no adverse employment action.  Summary judgment was,
therefore, proper on both the quid pro quo sexual harassment and the retaliation claims.3
B.  Hostile Work Environment
In order to succeed on her claim that the Diocese of Scranton and the Villa St.
Joseph are liable for creating a “hostile work environment”, Angeloni was required to
satisfy a five-prong test, showing that: (1) she suffered intentional discrimination because
of her sex; (2) the discrimination was “pervasive and regular”; (3) she was detrimentally
affected; (4) the discrimination she points to would also detrimentally affect another
reasonable young woman in the same position; and (5) respondeat superior liability
exists.  See Suders, 325 F.3d at 441.  The District Court concluded that there was “no
dispute” that the first and third requirements were satisfied, and held that a reasonable
jury could find that the second and fourth requirements were also met.  While it appears
that the District Court’s conclusions might have been overly generous to Angeloni, we
will accept them and nonetheless affirm the grant of summary judgment, as the final
requirement certainly was not met.  Angeloni’s claim of hostile work environment,
therefore, necessarily fails.  
Applying traditional agency principles, respondeat superior liability exists when
8“the defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action.”  Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990)
(internal citations omitted).  Therefore, “if a plaintiff proves that management-level
employees had actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually hostile
work environment and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial action, the employer
will be liable.”  Id.
Angeloni admits that she did not tell Ms. Balint about the touching until May or
June of 1997.  By July, Ms. Balint had told Bishop Dougherty.  Even assuming that Ms.
Balint and Bishop Dougherty would be considered management-level “employees”, both
took “prompt and adequate” remedial action.  For her part, Ms. Balint referred the matter
to Bishop Dougherty, interviewed the other waitresses, and suggested that Angeloni
could be relieved of her serving duties at Reverend Hazzouri’s table.  For his part,
Bishop Dougherty said that he felt he “had to get to the bottom of this,” so he spoke with
Reverend Hazzouri and Ms. Balint several times.  He also relayed the situation to the
Diocese and told Reverend Hazzouri that he was to cease any conduct that might make
Angeloni uncomfortable.  Finally, he approved Ms. Balint’s suggestion that Angeloni
stop serving Reverend Hazzouri’s table, a suggestion that was immediately implemented.
In terms of the adequacy of these remedial steps, by all accounts any touching that
had occurred ended by July 1997.  Indeed, even after Angeloni chose to ignore the
suggestion not to serve Reverend Hazzouri, and began doing so again, she never reported
further inappropriate conduct.  Summary judgment was properly granted on the hostile
     Although individually named in the suit, Reverend Hazzouri could not be liable under4
Title VII because he was not Angeloni’s employer; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
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environment claim.4
2.  State Law Claims
The District Court also concluded that, because summary judgment was granted
on Angeloni’s federal claims, it would not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims.  The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is a matter of discretion.  See
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (“[P]endent
jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.”), superseded by statute
in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction”).  And, as we have stated, when a federal claim could be, or has been,
dismissed on summary judgment, “the court should ordinarily refrain from exercising
[supplemental] jurisdiction in the absence of extraordinary circumstances.”  Tully v. Mott
Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1976); see also Univ. of Md. v. Peat,
Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1540 (3d Cir. 1993).  The District Court properly
refrained from exercising supplemental jurisdiction here. 
IV.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.  
